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abstRact: under the dual sovereignty doctrine the Supreme court has 
accepted that different sovereigns may prosecute an individual for 
the same facts without violating the double jeopardy clause if the act 
of the individual infringed the laws of each sovereignty. This article 
aims to analyze the evolution of the dual sovereignty doctrine in the 
case law of the Supreme court of the united States. Although the 
doctrine has been highly criticized by scholars, the Supreme court has 
persistently upheld it. . Besides, the article addresses the safeguards that 
currently exist against eventual abuses of the dual sovereignty doctrine, 
such as the “sham exception” and the “Petite Policy”. Finally, since the 
previous safeguards have been considered insufficient, the contribution 
briefly explores the possibility of applying the eighth Amendment as 
an additional protection against eventual abuses committed under the 
dual sovereignty doctrine. 
KeywoRds: Double jeopardy; multiple prosecutions; dual sovereignty 
doctrine.
Resumen:	Bajo	la	doctrina	de	la	soberanía	dual,	la	Corte	Suprema	ha	aceptado	
que	diferentes	soberanos	persigan	penalmente	a	la	misma	persona	sin	violar	
la	cláusula	double	jeopardy	por	los	mismos	hechos	si	es	que	la	conducta	de	
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tal	individuo	infringió	las	leyes	de	cada	soberano.	El	presente	artículo	
tiene	por	objeto	estudiar	la	evolución	de	la	doctrina	de	la	soberanía	dual	
en	la	jurisprudencia	de	la	Corte	Suprema.	Además,	el	artículo	aborda	las	
protecciones	actualmente	existentes	en	contra	de	eventuales	abusos	
que	puedan	ser	cometidos	bajo	la	doctrina	de	la	soberanía	dual,	tales	
como	la	“sham	exception”	y	la	“Petite	Policy”.	Finalmente,	y	dado	que	las	
anteriores	protecciones	han	sido	consideradas	insuficientes,	el	artículo	
explora	brevemente	la	posibilidad	de	aplicar	la	Octava	Enmienda	como	
una	protección	adicional	en	contra	de	eventuales	abusos	que	la	aplicación	
de	la	doctrina	de	la	soberanía	dual	pueda	generar.	
PalabRas-clave: Ne	bis	in	idem;	persecuciones	múltiples;	doctrina	de	la	
soberanía	dual.	
summaRy: introduction; 1. The evolution of the Dual Sovereignty 
Doctrine; 2. Definition of Sovereign for Double Jeopardy Purposes; 
3. The Sham exception; 4. The Petite Policy; 5. The Dual Sovereignty 
Doctrine After Gamble v. united States; conclusions; Bibliography.
IntRoductIon
The Fifth Amendment provision against double jeopardy is 
one of the basic protections afforded defendants by the United States 
Constitution.2 The Fifth Amendment reads in part:
“Nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb”.
The United States Constitution was the first major constitutional 
instrument to recognize the protection against double jeopardy, and was 
largely inspired by the operation in English law of what are referred to 
as pleas in bar.3 Even though the precise origins of the protection are 
2 SIGLER, Jay. Federal Double Jeopardy Policy, Vanderbilt Law Review, v. 19, n. 
2, p. 375, 1966.
3 KOKLYS, Andrea. Second Chance for Justice: Reevaluation of the United 
States Double Jeopardy Standard, John Marshall Law Review, v. 40, n. 1, p. 
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unclear,4 there is no doubt that the double jeopardy possesses a long 
history.5 As Justice Black correctly affirmed, the protection against being 
tried twice for the same offense is one of the oldest ideas found in western 
civilization, which roots run deep into Greek and Roman times.6
The double jeopardy protection has been characterized as a 
fundamental right and as a “cardinal principle” that lies at the foundation 
of criminal law.7 In Benton v. Maryland, the United States Supreme Court 
affirmed that “the fundamental nature of the guarantee against double 
jeopardy can hardly be doubted”.8 
According to the Supreme Court, the double jeopardy clause 
provides three basic related protections: “It protects against a second 
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a 
second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects 
against multiple punishments for the same offense”.9 
Notwithstanding the protections afforded by the clause seem 
to be quite broad, since the mid-19th century the Supreme Court has 
379, 2006; SUMMERS, Brian. Double Jeopardy: Rethinking the Parameters of 
the Multiplicity Prohibition, Ohio State Law Journal, v. 56, n. 5, p. 1595, 1995.
4 For example, David Rudstein and Jay Sigler state that the Code of Hammu-
rabi made no reference to double jeopardy clause. SIGLER, Jay. A History of 
Double Jeopardy, American Journal of Legal History, v. 7, n. 4, p. 284 (note 6), 
1963; RUDSTEIN, David. A Brief History of the Fifth Amendment Guarantee 
Against Double Jeopardy, William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal, v. 14, n. 1, p. 
196, 2005. On the contrary, Thomas III affirms that “laws against changing a fi-
nal judgment can be traced to the Code of Hammurabi”. THOMAS III, George, 
Double Jeopardy. The History, the Law, New York University Press, 1998, p. 1.
5 RUDSTEIN, David. A Brief History of the Fifth Amendment Guarantee 
Against Double Jeopardy, William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal, v. 14, n. 1, p. 
196, 2005. 
6 Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151-152 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting). 
7 PRINCIPATO, Daniel. Defining the Sovereign in Dual Sovereignty: Does the 
Protection against Double Jeopardy Bar Successive Prosecutions in National 
and International Courts, Cornell International Law Journal, v. 47, n. 3, p. 
769, 2014.
8 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969).
9 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). See also United States v. 
Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343 (1975); Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 380-381 
(1989); United States v. Dixon, 509 U. S. 688, 696 (1993); United States v. 
Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 273 (1996). 
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developed the dual sovereignty doctrine, according to which different 
sovereigns may prosecute an individual without violating the double 
jeopardy clause if the act of the individual act infringed the laws of each 
sovereignty, even though the offenses contain identical elements.10 
The Supreme Court has stated that the essence of the dual 
sovereignty doctrine is the common law conception of crime as an 
offense against the sovereignty of the government.11 If a defendant 
in a single act violates the “peace and dignity” of two sovereigns 
by breaking the laws of each of them, hence he has committed two 
distinct offenses.12 
Regarding its legal basis, the dual sovereignty doctrine was 
recognized to protect principles of federalism.13 As correctly indicated, 
behind the dual sovereignty debate there is a conflict between two legal 
principles: sovereignty and double jeopardy.14 The Supreme Court was 
10 ADLER, Adam. Dual Sovereignty, Due Process, and Duplicative Punishment: 
A New Solution to an Old Problem, Yale Law Journal, v. 124, n. 2, p. 450, 
2014; WOODS, Christina. Comments: The Dual Sovereignty Exception to 
Double Jeopardy: An Unnecessary Loophole, University of Baltimore Law Re-
view, v. 24, n. 1, pp. 177-178, 1994; MERKL, Taryn. The Federalization of 
Criminal Law and Double Jeopardy, Columbia Human Rights Law Review, v. 
31, n. 1, p. 185, 1999.
11 Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985).
12 Heath v. Alabama, 88; United States v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377, 382 (1922); 
BRICKMAN, Jay. The Dual Sovereignty Doctrine and Successive State Pros-
ecutions: Health v. Alabama, Chicago-Kent Law Review, v. 63, n. 1, p. 176, 
1987; RUDSTEIN, David. Double Jeopardy. A Reference Guide to the United 
States Constitution, Praeger, p. 84, 2004; COLANGELO, Anthony. Double 
Jeopardy and Multiple Sovereigns: A Jurisdictional Theory, Washington 
University Law Review, v. 86, n. 4, p. 779, 2009; MCANINCH, William. Un-
folding the Law of Double Jeopardy, South Carolina Law Review, v. 44, n. 3, 
pp. 424-425, 1993.
13 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 320 (1978); CRANMAN, Erin. The 
Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeopardy: A Champion of Justice or a 
Violation of a Fundamental Right, Emory International Law Review, v. 14, n. 
3, p. 1654, 2000; FISHER, Walter. Double Jeopardy, Two Sovereignties and 
the Intruding Constitution, The University of Chicago Law Review, v. 28, n. 
4, p. 599, 1961.
14 OWSLEY, David. Accepting the Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeop-
ardy: A Hard Case Study, Washington University Law Review, v. 81, n. 3, p. 
797, 2003. 
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concerned that an expansive reading of the double jeopardy clause would 
bar either the Federal Government or individual state governments from 
enforcing their respective criminal laws.15 As James King has pointed 
out, the dual sovereignty doctrine is partially based on the concern that 
“a contrary rule would allow one government to effectively nullify the 
other government’s law”.16 
In addition, the Supreme Court has noted that the dual sovereignty 
doctrine would prevent an eventual racing of defendants to plead guilty 
in state court, thereby evading subsequent federal prosecution carrying 
larger penalties.17 In United States v. Lanza, the Court explained: “If a State 
were to punish the manufacture, transportation and sale of intoxicating 
liquor by small or nominal fines, the race of offenders to the courts of 
that State to plead guilty and secure immunity from federal prosecution 
for such acts would not make for respect for the federal statute or for 
its deterrent effect”.18 
Although the dual sovereignty doctrine has been highly criticized 
by scholars, the Supreme Court has persistently upheld it. On 17 June 
2019, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Gamble v. United 
States,19 adding a new chapter to this history. In a 7-2 decision, the Court 
upheld once again its long-standing dual sovereignty doctrine under the 
double jeopardy clause.20
15 PRINCIPATO, Daniel. Defining the Sovereign in Dual Sovereignty: Does the 
Protection against Double Jeopardy Bar Successive Prosecutions in National 
and International Courts, Cornell International Law Journal, v. 47, n. 3, p. 773, 
2014; CRANMAN, Erin. The Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeopar-
dy: A Champion of Justice or a Violation of a Fundamental Right, Emory In-
ternational Law Review, v. 14, n. 3, p. 1654, 2000.
16 KING, James. The Problem of Double Jeopardy in Successive Federal-State 
Prosecutions: A Fifth Amendment Solution, Stanford Law Review, v. 31, n. 3, 
p. 477, 1979.
17 OWSLEY, David. Accepting the Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeop-
ardy: A Hard Case Study, Washington University Law Review, v. 81, n. 3, p. 
773, 2003. 
18 United States v. Lanza, 385. See also Heath v. Alabama, 93.
19 Gamble v. United States, 587 U.S. ___ (2019).
20 ESCOBAR, Javier. Double Jeopardy and Dual Sovereignty Doctrine: Gamble 
v. United States, Revista de Derecho, v. 20, n. 2, p. 227, 2019. 
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This article aims to analyze the evolution of the dual sovereignty 
doctrine in the case law of the Supreme Court of the United States. Although 
the doctrine has been highly criticized by scholars, the Supreme Court has 
persistently upheld it. Besides, the article addresses the safeguards that 
currently exist against eventual abuses of the dual sovereignty doctrine, 
such as the “sham exception” and the “Petite Policy”. Finally, since the 
previous safeguards have been considered insufficient, the contribution 
briefly explores the possibility of applying the Eighth Amendment as an 
additional protection against eventual abuses committed under the dual 
sovereignty doctrine. 
1. the evolutIon of the dual soveReIgnty doctRIne
1.1. the antebellum cases. 
The Supreme Court has underlined that the dual sovereignty 
doctrine is consistent with its case law and respects the possibility that 
two sovereigns could have different interests “in punishing the same act”.21 
The issue of successive federal and state prosecutions was 
addressed by the Supreme Court in three antebellum cases. 
In Fox v. Ohio, decided in 1847, the Supreme Court condoned the 
possibility of concurrent criminal jurisdiction, and dismissed the argument 
of the defendant that under the double jeopardy clause “offences falling 
within the competency of different authorities to restrain or punish 
them would not properly be subjected to the consequences which those 
authorities might ordain and affix to their perpetration”.22 The Court 
observed that the nature of the crime or its effects on “public safety” 
might well demand separate prosecutions.23 
Three years later, in United States v. Marigold, the Supreme 
Court generalized the reasoning of Fox. The Court pointed out that with 
21 Gamble v. United States, 5-6. 
22 Fox v. The State of Ohio, 46 U.S. 410, 435 (1847); OWSLEY, David. Accept-
ing the Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeopardy: A Hard Case Study, 
Washington University Law Review, v. 81, n. 3, p. 771, 2003.
23 Fox v. The State of Ohio, 435. 
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the view of avoiding conflicts between state and federal jurisdictions, 
in Fox v. Ohio it stated that “the same act might, as to its character and 
tendencies, and the consequences it involved, constitute an offence 
against both the State and Federal governments, and might draw to its 
commission the penalties denounced by either, as appropriate to its 
character in reference to each”.24 
Finally, in Moore v. People of State of Illinois the Supreme Court 
expanded its concern for the distinct interests of the different sovereigns. 
In this case, the Supreme Court affirmed that admitting that the defendant 
may be punished both under state and federal law does not mean that 
he would be punished twice for the same offence, since “an offence, in 
its legal signification, means the transgression of a law”.25 The Court 
added that every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State, 
therefore he may be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and may 
be liable to punishment for an infraction of the laws of either.26 If a same 
act transgresses the laws of two sovereignties, concluded the Court, the 
idea that either or both may punish such an offender cannot be doubted.27
1.2.  the develoPment of the dual soveReIgnty doctRIne: unIted 
states v. lanza.
The Supreme Court cemented the previous reasoning in United 
States v. Lanza, decided in 1922. This was the first time that the Supreme 
Court directly addressed the question of successive prosecutions by 
different sovereignties for the same conduct.28 
24 United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. 560, 569 (1850).
25 Moore v. People of State of Illinois, 55 U.S. 13, 19 (1852); ALLEN, Ronald 
and RATNASWAMY, John. Heath v. Alabama: A Case Study of Doctrine and 
Rationality in the Supreme Court, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, v. 
76, n. 4, p. 812, 1985. 
26 Moore v. People of State of Illinois, 20. 
27 Moore v. People of State of Illinois, 20.
28 OWSLEY, David. Accepting the Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeop-
ardy: A Hard Case Study, Washington University Law Review, v. 81, n. 3, p. 
773, 2003; MULLEN, Kayla, Gamble v. United States: A Commentary. Duke 
Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy, v. 14, n. 1, p. 210, 2019.
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In this case, the defendants were charged in federal court with 
manufacturing, transporting and possessing intoxicating liquor in violation 
of the Volstead Act. The defendants argued that a previous conviction 
under a state statute for manufacturing, transporting and possessing 
intoxicating liquor was a bar to the subsequent federal prosecution for 
the same act under the Fifth Amendment.29 
After citing a “long line of decisions” dating back to Fox v. Ohio,30 
the Supreme Court ruled that the subsequent federal prosecution, after the 
state conviction, did not violate the double jeopardy clause. According to 
the Court, there were two different sovereignties, each of them capable 
of dealing with the same subject-matter within the same territory. In 
determining what shall be an offense against its peace and dignity, each 
of these sovereignty is exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the 
other.31 Therefore, “an act denounced as a crime by both national and 
state sovereignties is an offense against the peace and dignity of both 
and may be punished by each”.32 
Under the ruling of United States v. Lanza, the violation of 
proscriptions emanated from different “sovereigns” are different offenses for 
purposes of the double jeopardy clause. Consequently, as this constitutional 
protection only prohibits successive prosecutions or punishments for 
the “same offense”, successive prosecutions or punishments by different 
sovereigns are not barred by the Fifth Amendment.33
1.3. the case law afteR unIted states v. lanza.
The doctrine of Lanza was subsequently applied in several cases. 
Four years later, in Hebert v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court upheld a 
29 United States v. Lanza, 378-380. 
30 United States v. Lanza, 382-384.
31 United States v. Lanza, 382.
32 United States v. Lanza, 382; BRICKMAN, Jay. The Dual Sovereignty Doctrine 
and Successive State Prosecutions: Health v. Alabama, Chicago-Kent Law Re-
view, v. 63, n. 1, p. 177, 1987.
33 DAWSON, Michael. Popular Sovereignty, Double Jeopardy, and the Dual Sov-
ereignty Doctrine, Yale Law Journal, v. 102, n. 1, p. 292, 1992.
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state conviction following a federal prosecution for the same conduct, 
rejecting any violation of the double jeopardy clause. The Court stated 
that where the same conduct is criminalized both under state and federal 
law, the person that “engages therein commits two distinct offenses, one 
against the United States and one against the State, and may be subjected 
to prosecution and punishment in the federal courts for one and in the 
state courts for the other without any infraction of the constitutional 
rule against double jeopardy”.34
In Westfall v. United States, in response to a question certified by 
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals arising upon a review of convictions, 
the Supreme Court, citing Lanza, directly affirmed that “of course an act 
may be criminal under the laws of both jurisdictions”.35
Afterwards, in Jerome v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled 
that the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment does not 
stand as a bar to federal prosecution though a state conviction based on 
the same acts has already been obtained.36 
Finally, in Screws v. United States37 the Supreme Court underlined 
that “the petitioners may be guilty of manslaughter or murder under 
Georgia law and at the same time liable for the federal offense proscribed 
by § 20”.38 Moreover, the Court explained that “the instances where an 
act denounced as a crime by both national and state sovereignties may 
be punished by each without violation of the double jeopardy provision 
of the Fifth Amendment are common”.39 
34 Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 314 (1926).
35 Westfall v. United States, 274 U.S. 256. 258 (1927). 
36 Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 105 (1943). 
37 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
38 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 108 (note 10) (1945). Section 20 provid-
ed: “Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or cus-
tom, willfully subjects’, or causes to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State, 
Territory, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured or protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States, or 
to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such inhabitant 
being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the 
punishment of citizens, shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned 
not more than one year, or both”.
39 Screws v. United States, 108 (note 10). 
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1.4.  solIdIfIcatIon of the dual soveReIgnty doctRIne: baRtKus v. 
IllInoIs and abbate v. unIted states.
It was not until 1959 that the Supreme Court reexamined the 
dual sovereignty doctrine. In Bartkus v. Illinois40 and Abbate v. United 
States,41 both decided the same day, the Supreme Court solidified the 
dual sovereignty doctrine.42
In Bartkus v. Illinois, the Supreme Court upheld a state prosecution 
after a federal acquittal.43 The defendant had been tried and acquitted by a 
jury in a federal court for robbery of a federally insured savings and loan 
association. After the federal prosecution, the defendant was indicted 
for substantially the same facts by a jury in Illinois. The accused filed 
a motion of autrefois acquit but the Illinois trial court rejected it. The 
defendant was tried, convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.44 
In the first place, the Supreme Court remarked that the rule 
that successive state and federal prosecutions do not violate the Fifth 
Amendment had been repeatedly upheld since Lanza,45 not only by the 
same Supreme Court, but also by state and federal courts.46
For the Supreme Court, it was essential to ensure that states did 
not forfeit their right to enforce their criminal laws for the purpose of 
permitting federal prosecutions,47 especially because state and federal 
offenses criminalizing the same conduct often carry drastically different 
penalties. As example, the Court cited Screws v. United States, a case in 
40 Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
41 Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
42 OWSLEY, David. Accepting the Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeop-
ardy: A Hard Case Study, Washington University Law Review, v. 81, n. 3, p. 
773, 2003.
43 BRAUN, Daniel. Praying to False Sovereigns: The Rule Permitting Succes-
sive Prosecutions in the Age of Cooperative Federalism, American Journal of 
Criminal Law, v. 20, n. 1, p. 3, 1992. 
44 Bartkus v. Illinois, 121-122.
45 Bartkus v. Illinois, 132. 
46 Bartkus v. Illinois, 136.
47 CRANMAN, Erin. The Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeopardy: A 
Champion of Justice or a Violation of a Fundamental Right, Emory Interna-
tional Law Review, v. 14, n. 3, p. 1655, 2000. 
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which defendants were firstly tried and convicted under federal statutes 
with maximum sentences of a year and two years respectively, but the 
state crime there involved was a capital offense. If states were barred from 
prosecuting a defendant for a serious offence after a federal prosecution 
for a minor offence based on the same conduct, the result would be a 
shocking deprivation of the historic right and obligation of the states to 
maintain peace and order within their confines. The Court stated that 
it would be in derogation of the federal system to displace the power 
of states over state offenses by reason of prosecution of minor federal 
offenses by federal authorities beyond the control of the states.48
In Abbate v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld a federal 
conviction after a state conviction for the same conduct. The defendants 
had been convicted of conspiring to dynamite facilities of a telephone 
company during an extended labor dispute, and were sentenced by a state 
court to three months’ imprisonment. Subsequently, the defendants were 
convicted in a federal court of conspiracy to destroy integral parts of a 
communication system. Both state and federal convictions were based 
on the same facts.49 
Firstly, the Supreme Court noted that Lanza had clearly established 
that a prior state conviction did not bar a subsequent federal prosecution.50 
Therefore, the defendants in Abbate were asking to overrule Lanza. The 
Supreme Court declined to do so, affirming that there was no persuasive 
reason to abandon that firmly established principle. The Court remarked 
that if Lanza were overruled undesirable consequences would follow, as it 
was recognized a century ago in Fox v. Ohio. If a state prosecution would 
bar a following federal prosecution based on the same acts, federal law 
enforcement would necessarily be hindered. However, it would also be a 
mistake to suggest, in order to maintain the effectiveness of federal law 
enforcement, displacing state power to prosecute crimes based on acts 
which might also violate federal law.51 Just as happened in Bartkus, the 
Supreme Court was concerned on the disparity in penalties provided by 
48 Bartkus v. Illinois, 137.
49 Abbate v. United States, 187-189. 
50 Abbate v. United States, 193.
51 Abbate v. United States, 195.
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state and federal law. While the defendants had been convicted to three 
months’ imprisonment under state law, under federal law they could be 
convicted up to five years’ imprisonment.52
Bartkus and Abbate were extensively criticized,53 especially by 
Justice Black in his dissenting opinion in Bartkus.54 Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court was not receptive to the critics and continued applying 
the dual sovereignty doctrine. 
Not even Benton v. Maryland, the case in which the Supreme 
Court ruled that the double jeopardy was incorporated in the Fourteenth 
Amendment and was thereby applicable to the states,55 could challenge 
the application of the dual sovereignty doctrine.56 In Gamble v. United 
Stated, the defendant argued that the recognition of the incorporation of 
the double jeopardy clause had washed away any theoretical foundation 
for the dual sovereignty doctrine.57 The Supreme Court rejected the 
argument, stating that the premises of the dual sovereignty doctrine 
have survived incorporation intact. Incorporation meant that the states 
were now required to abide the interpretation of the Court on double 
jeopardy, but that interpretation has long included the dual sovereignty 
52 Abbate v. United States, 195.
53 BOYLE, Richard. Double Jeopardy and Dual Sovereignty: The Impact of Ben-
ton v. Maryland on Successive Prosecution for the Same Offense by State 
and Federal Governments, Indiana Law Journal, v. 46, n. 3, p. 418. 1971; 
KING, James. The Problem of Double Jeopardy in Successive Federal-State 
Prosecutions: A Fifth Amendment Solution, Stanford Law Review, v. 31, n. 3, 
p. 483, 1979.
54 Bartkus v. Illinois, 150-164 (Black dissenting). 
55 Benton v. Maryland, 784. 
56 OWSLEY, David. Accepting the Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeop-
ardy: A Hard Case Study, Washington University Law Review, v. 81, n. 3, p. 
776, 2003. Critically, and suggesting the necessity of a serious reexamination 
of the dual sovereignty doctrine after Benton v. Maryland, BOYLE, Richard. 
Double Jeopardy and Dual Sovereignty: The Impact of Benton v. Maryland 
on Successive Prosecution for the Same Offense by State and Federal Gov-
ernments, Indiana Law Journal, v. 46, n. 3, pp. 422-427, 1971; MULLEN, Kay-
la. Gamble v. United States: A Commentary. Duke Journal of Constitutional 
Law & Public Policy, v. 14, n. 1, p. 210, 2019; STONER, Ray. Double Jeopardy 
and Dual Sovereignty: A Critical Analysis, William & Mary Law Review, v. 11, 
n. 4, pp. 952-954, 1970.
57 Gamble v. United States, 29. 
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doctrine.58 As has been explained, the dual sovereignty doctrine rests on 
the fact that different prosecutions by distinct sovereignties are not the 
same offense for double jeopardy purposes, and that is just as true after 
incorporation as before.59
1.5.  the dual soveReIgnty doctRIne and successIve 
PRosecutIons In by dIffeRent states: heath v. alabama.
In Heath v. Alabama, decided in 1985, the Supreme Court faced a 
question that, until that moment, had not directly answered: whether the 
dual sovereignty doctrine was also applicable to successive prosecutions 
under the laws of different states. 
In August 1981, the petitioner left his residence in Alabama to 
meet with the two men in Georgia. After hiring them to kill his wife, 
petitioner led them back to his residence and gave them the keys of the 
car and house. The two men kidnaped the victim from her home and killed 
her.60 Both Georgia and Alabama authorities pursued dual investigations. 
In September 1981, the petitioner was arrested by Georgia authorities. He 
was convicted and sentenced under Georgia law to life imprisonment.61 
In May 1982, the petitioner was indicted by a grand jury in Alabama. 
Before the trial, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, 
arguing that his conviction in Georgia barred his prosecution in Alabama 
for the same offense. The motion was rejected. The defendant was then 
tried, convicted and sentenced to death.62 
The Supreme Court underlined once again that “successive 
prosecutions are barred by the Fifth Amendment only if the two offenses 
for which the defendant is prosecuted are the same for double jeopardy 
purposes”.63 Consequently, the Court ruled that “the dual sovereignty 
58 Gamble v. United States, 30.
59 Gamble v. United States, 30.
60 Heath v. Alabama, 83-84.
61 Heath v. Alabama, 84.
62 Heath v. Alabama, 85-86.
63 Heath v. Alabama, 87. 
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doctrine, as originally articulated and consistently applied by this Court, 
compels the conclusion that successive prosecutions by two states for the 
same conduct are not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause”.64 
States have been uniformly considered as separate sovereigns 
with respect to the Federal Government, because the power of each state 
to prosecute is derived from its own “inherent sovereignty”, not from 
the Federal Government.65 In this context, “states are no less sovereign 
with respect to each other than they are with respect to the Federal 
Government. Their powers to undertake criminal prosecutions derive 
from separate and independent sources of power and authority originally 
belonging to them before admission to the Union and preserved to them 
by the Tenth Amendment”.66 
Moreover, the Supreme Court highlighted that “among the 
prerogatives of sovereignty is the power to create and enforce a criminal 
code. Therefore, denying a state its power to enforce its criminal laws 
because another state has won the race to the courthouse “would be a 
shocking and untoward deprivation of the historic right and obligation 
of the states to maintain peace and order within their confines”.67 After 
all, the interest of a state in “vindicating its sovereign authority through 
enforcement of its laws by definition can never be satisfied by another 
state’s enforcement of its own laws”.68 
In conclusion, the dual sovereignty doctrine permits successive 
prosecutions in three cases: (1) successive prosecutions of an individual by 
multiple state governments; (2) successive prosecutions of an individual 
by a state and the federal government; and (3) successive prosecutions 
of an individual by a state or the Federal Government and a foreign 
64 Heath v. Alabama, 88; MERKL, Taryn. The Federalization of Criminal Law 
and Double Jeopardy, Columbia Human Rights Law Review, v. 31, n. 1, p. 
185, 1999.
65 Heath v. Alabama, 89.
66 Heath v. Alabama, 89. 
67 Heath v. Alabama, 93.
68 Heath v. Alabama, 93. For a critical comment on the arguments of the Su-
preme Court, see ALLEN, Ronald and RATNASWAMY, John. Heath v. Ala-
bama: A Case Study of Doctrine and Rationality in the Supreme Court, Jour-
nal of Criminal Law and Criminology, v. 76, n. 4, p. 814-824, 1985. 
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government.69 By contrast, successive prosecutions for the same offense 
by the same sovereign are prohibited by the double jeopardy clause.70 
1.6.  the dual soveReIgnty doctRIne In 2019: gamble v. unIted states.71
On 17 June 2019, the Supreme Court delivered its decision in 
Gamble v. United States, its last judgment on the dual sovereignty doctrine. 
In 2008, the petitioner was convicted of second-degree robbery 
in Alabama. In November 2015, a local police officer searched the car 
of the defendant and found a firearm. Since the defendant had been 
convicted of second-degree robbery, his possession of the handgun 
violated an Alabama law providing that no one convicted of a crime of 
violence “shall own a firearm or have one in his or her possession”.72 The 
defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to one year in prison. After 
his conviction, federal prosecutors charged him with the federal version 
of the same offense based on the same fact.73
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the federal 
indictment was barred by the double jeopardy clause. Relying on the 
dual sovereignty doctrine, the District Court rejected the motion and 
the Court of Appeals affirmed.74 The defendant then filed a petition for a 
69 CRANMAN, Erin. The Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeopardy: A 
Champion of Justice or a Violation of a Fundamental Right, Emory Interna-
tional Law Review, v. 14, n. 3, p. 1644, 2000; PRINCIPATO, Daniel. Defin-
ing the Sovereign in Dual Sovereignty: Does the Protection against Double 
Jeopardy Bar Successive Prosecutions in National and International Courts, 
Cornell International Law Journal, v. 47, n. 3, p. 773, 2014. 
70 PRINCIPATO, Daniel. Defining the Sovereign in Dual Sovereignty: Does the 
Protection against Double Jeopardy Bar Successive Prosecutions in Nation-
al and International Courts, Cornell International Law Journal, v. 47, n. 3, p. 
774, 2014. 
71 A first commentary on Gamble v. United States can be found in ESCOBAR, 
Javier. Double Jeopardy and Dual Sovereignty Doctrine: Gamble v. United 
States, Revista de Derecho, v. 20, n. 2, 2019.
72 Gamble v. United States, 2.
73 Gamble v. United States, 2. 
74 MULLEN, Kayla. Gamble v. United States: A Commentary. Duke Journal of 
Constitutional Law & Public Policy, v. 14, n. 1, p. 209, 2019. 
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writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court, which was granted to consider 
“whether the Court should overrule the ‘separate sovereigns’ exception 
to the double jeopardy clause”.75
In its decision, the Supreme Court upheld the dual sovereignty 
doctrine, concluding that the Federal Government and a state government 
can bring separate criminal prosecutions against the same person for 
the same conduct. Because each sovereign can define its own offenses, 
if a single act violates different sovereigns’ laws it will constitute two 
separate “offenses”.
In the first place, the Supreme Court clarified that, although 
the dual sovereignty rule is often dubbed an “exception” to the double 
jeopardy clause,76 it is not an exception at all. On the contrary, it 
flows from the explicit textual reference that the Fifth Amendment 
makes to the “same offense” requirement.77 Because that the term 
“offense” was originally understood as transgression of a law,78 
and that each law is defined by a sovereign, the Court affirmed 
that “where there are two sovereigns, there are two laws, and two 
offences”.79 According to the Court, there is no reason to abandon 
75 Gamble v. United States, Question Presented, Certiorari Granted on 28 June 
2018. 
76 For instance, see PRINCIPATO, Daniel. Defining the Sovereign in Dual Sov-
ereignty: Does the Protection against Double Jeopardy Bar Successive Pros-
ecutions in National and International Courts, Cornell International Law 
Journal, v. 47, n. 3, p. 773, 2014; MULLEN, Kayla. Gamble v. United States: 
A Commentary. Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy, v. 14, n. 
1, p. 207, 2019; MATZ, Robert. Dual Sovereignty and the Double Jeopardy 
Clause: If at First You Don’t Convict, Try, Try, Again, Fordham Urban Law 
Journal, v. 24, n. 2, p. 359, 1997; WOODS, Christina. Comments: The Dual 
Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeopardy: An Unnecessary Loophole, 
University of Baltimore Law Review, v. 24, n. 1, pp. 177-178, 1994; MERKL, 
Taryn. The Federalization of Criminal Law and Double Jeopardy, Columbia 
Human Rights Law Review, v. 31, n. 1, p. 177, 1999; LEE, Evan. The Dual 
Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeopardy: In the Wake of Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, New England Law Review, v. 22, n. 
1, p. 35, 1987.
77 Gamble v. United States, 3.
78 Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 667 (1892). 
79 Gamble v. United States, 3-4.
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this interpretation of the phrase “same offense”, from which the dual 
sovereignty doctrine follows.80 
The Court highlighted that the text of the double jeopardy clause 
“does more than honor the formal difference between two distinct criminal 
codes. It honors the substantive differences between the interests that 
two sovereigns can have in punishing the same act”.81 
In order to explain its position, the Supreme Court utilized as 
example a prosecution in the United States for a crime committed abroad: 
if an American national is murdered abroad, both the foreign country and 
the United States will be interested in punishing the killer. On the one 
hand, the interest of the other country will be protecting the peace in 
its territory. On the other hand, the interest of the United States will be 
protecting its nationals. The murder in question, therefore, will constitute 
an offence to the United States as much as it will be to the country where 
the murder occurred and to which the victim is a stranger. For this reason, 
the killing of an American national abroad is a federal offence that can 
be prosecuted in the American courts.82
2. defInItIon of soveReIgn foR double JeoPaRdy PuRPoses
Since under the dual sovereignty doctrine the double jeopardy 
clause only bars successive prosecutions by the same sovereign, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that it is crucial to determine whether 
the two entities that seek successively to prosecute a defendant for the 
same offense can be termed separate sovereigns.83 
According to the case law of the Supreme Court, the question of 
whether two entities are separate sovereigns “turns on whether the two 
entities draw their authority to punish the offender from distinct sources 
80 Gamble v. United States, 5.
81 Gamble v. United States, 5-6.
82 Gamble v. United States, 7.
83 Heath v. Alabama, 88; COLANGELO, Anthony. Double Jeopardy and Multi-
ple Sovereigns: A Jurisdictional Theory, Washington University Law Review, v. 
86, n. 4, p. 779, 2009. 
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of power”.84 Thus, for double jeopardy purposes the sovereignty of two 
prosecuting entities is determined by the ultimate source of the power 
under which the respective prosecutions were taken.85 If two entities 
have the same “ultimate source of power”, hence they both should be 
considered as one sovereign.86 
With regard to the meaning of “last source of power”, in Heath 
v. Alabama the Supreme Court underlined that two entities are separate 
sovereigns when each has the power to independently determine what 
shall be an offense against its authority and to punish such offenses.87 
In applying the above considerations, the Supreme Court has 
ruled that, for double jeopardy purposes, a state and its municipalities are 
the same sovereign.88 Therefore, a state and its municipality are barred 
from prosecuting an individual for the same offense, not being applicable 
the double sovereignty doctrine.89 In holding this, the Supreme Court 
emphasized that “political subdivisions of states (…) never were and 
never have been considered as sovereign entities. Rather, they have been 
traditionally regarded as subordinate government instrumentalities created 
by the state to assist in the carrying out of state governmental functions”.90 
Similarly, the Federal Government and its territories have been 
considered the same sovereign for double jeopardy purposes.91 In deciding 
that the Philippines and the Federal Government were the same sovereign, 
84 Heath v. Alabama, 88. 
85 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 199 (2004); Heath v. Alabama, 90; United 
States v. Wheeler, 320. 
86 PRINCIPATO, Daniel. Defining the Sovereign in Dual Sovereignty: Does the 
Protection against Double Jeopardy Bar Successive Prosecutions in Nation-
al and International Courts, Cornell International Law Journal, v. 47, n. 3, p. 
774, 2014.
87 Heath v. Alabama, 89; REED, Akhil and MARCUS, Jonathan. Double Jeopardy 
Law After Rodney King, Columbia Law Review, v. 95, n. 1, p. 5, 1995.
88 Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 394-395 (1970). 
89 Waller v. Florida, 394-395. 
90 Waller v. Florida, 392. See also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964); 
MCANINCH, William. Unfolding the Law of Double Jeopardy, South Carolina 
Law Review, v. 44, n. 3, p. 425, 1993.
91 United States v. Wheeler, 318; Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 262-264 
(1937); Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 354 (1907).
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the Court observed that “the government of a state does not derive its 
powers from the United States, while the government of the Philippines 
owes its existence wholly to the United States, and its judicial tribunals 
exert all their powers by the authority of the United States”.92 
On the contrary, Native American nations and the Federal 
Government have been regarded as separate sovereigns for double jeopardy 
purposes.93
In conclusion, if an entity derives its sovereignty from another 
entity, then according to the Supreme Court those entities should be 
considered the same sovereign for double jeopardy purposes.94
3. the sham eXcePtIon
In Bartkus v. Illinois, the Supreme Court suggested that a 
successive prosecution by one sovereign might be barred in cases where it 
is merely a cover and a tool of another sovereign seeking to prosecute the 
same defendant. This exception has been called the “sham exception”.95 
In these cases, the prosecution brought by the second sovereign does 
not seek to vindicate its interest, but rather is pursued merely on behalf 
of the interest of the first sovereign.96 
In the specific case of Bartkus, however, the Supreme Court 
found that the degree of federal participation and involvement in the 
92 Grafton v. United States, 354.
93 United States v. Wheeler, 328-330.
94 PRINCIPATO, Daniel. Defining the Sovereign in Dual Sovereignty: Does the 
Protection against Double Jeopardy Bar Successive Prosecutions in National and 
International Courts, Cornell International Law Journal, v. 47, n. 3, p. 775, 2014.
95 MATZ, Robert. Dual Sovereignty and the Double Jeopardy Clause: If at First 
You Don’t Convict, Try, Try, Again, Fordham Urban Law Journal, v. 24, n. 2, p. 
361, 1997; WOODS, Christina. Comments: The Dual Sovereignty Exception 
to Double Jeopardy: An Unnecessary Loophole, University of Baltimore Law 
Review, v. 24, n. 1, p. 188, 1994. 
96 MATZ, Robert. Dual Sovereignty and the Double Jeopardy Clause: If at First 
You Don’t Convict, Try, Try, Again, Fordham Urban Law Journal, v. 24, n. 2, p. 
361, 1997; LOPEZ, Dax. Not Twice for the Same: How the Dual Sovereignty 
Doctrine Is Used to Circumvent Non Bis in Idem, Vanderbilt Journal of Trans-
national Law, v. 33, n. 5, pp. 1277-1278, 2000.
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state prosecution was not sufficient to apply the sham exception.97 In this 
regard, the Court affirmed: “The record establishes that the prosecution 
was undertaken by state prosecuting officials within their discretionary 
responsibility and on the basis of evidence that conduct contrary to the 
penal code of Illinois had occurred within their jurisdiction”.98 Moreover, 
the Court observed that the record established that “federal officials 
acted in cooperation with state authorities, as is the conventional practice 
between the two sets of prosecutors throughout the country”.99 
Consequently, the Court decided that the facts of the case did 
not support the claim that the prosecution brought by the State of Illinois 
was merely a tool of the federal authorities, who thereby avoided the 
prohibition established in the Fifth Amendment. The record of the case 
did not sustain a conclusion that “the state prosecution was a sham and 
a cover for a federal prosecution, and thereby in essential fact another 
federal prosecution”.100
Although many courts have accepted the existence of the “sham 
exception”, courts have not applied it, “setting an insurmountable bar for 
defendants to overcome”.101
4. the PetIte PolIcy
As previously stated, since its recognition the dual sovereignty 
doctrine has been highly criticized.102 Its critics argue that it offends the 
97 WOODS, Christina. Comments: The Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double 
Jeopardy: An Unnecessary Loophole, University of Baltimore Law Review, v. 
24, n. 1, p. 188, 1994.
98 Bartkus v. Illinois, 123.
99 Bartkus v. Illinois, 123. 
100 Bartkus v. Illinois, 123-124.
101 OWSLEY, David. Accepting the Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeop-
ardy: A Hard Case Study, Washington University Law Review, v. 81, n. 3, p. 
789, 2003; MATZ, Robert. Dual Sovereignty and the Double Jeopardy Clause: 
If at First You Don’t Convict, Try, Try, Again, Fordham Urban Law Journal, v. 
24, n. 2, p. 361, 1997.
102 For instance, Michael Dawson directly affirms that the dual sovereignty doc-
trine is unconstitutional. DAWSON, Michael. Popular Sovereignty, Double 
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interest of the defendants in finality and exposes them to capricious 
prosecutorial discretion.103 In addition, the absence of limits to the dual 
sovereignty doctrine would create an extreme potential for abuse.104 
Although in Bartkus v. Illinois the Supreme Court ruled that the 
double jeopardy clause does not bar a federal prosecution following a state 
prosecution for the same offence, shortly after Bartkus the Department 
of Justice announced, in Petite v. United States,105 the Petite Policy,106 
which restricts the prosecutorial discretion of the Federal Government,107 
thereby assuaging fears of arbitrary successive prosecutions.108 
The Petite Policy establishes guidelines for the exercise of 
discretion by the officers of the Department of Justice in determining 
whether to bring a federal prosecution based on substantially the same 
act involved in a prior state procedure. The aims of the Petite Policy are 
to vindicate substantial federal interests through appropriate federal 
prosecutions; to protect persons charged with criminal conduct from 
Jeopardy, and the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine, Yale Law Journal, v. 102, n. 1, 
pp. 299-302, 1992. Margaret Jones states that the dual sovereignty doctrine 
“has encouraged much abuse, being used principally as an easy way for pros-
ecutors to make a record for convictions with a minimum of effort, and a 
means of evading the constitutional provisions against compulsory self-in-
crimination and illegal searches and seizures”. JONES, Margaret. What Con-
stitutes Double Jeopardy, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, v. 38, n. 4, 
p. 382, 1948.
103 CRANMAN, Erin. The Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeopardy: A 
Champion of Justice or a Violation of a Fundamental Right, Emory Interna-
tional Law Review, v. 14, n. 3, p. 1667, 2000. 
104 CRANMAN, Erin. The Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeopardy: A 
Champion of Justice or a Violation of a Fundamental Right, Emory Interna-
tional Law Review, v. 14, n. 3, p. 1669, 2000.
105 Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960). 
106 Justice Manual, Title 9: Criminal, Section 9-2.031 – Dual and Successive Pros-
ecution Policy (“Petite Policy”), available at: https://www.justice.gov/jm/
jm-9-2000-authority-us-attorney-criminal-division-mattersprior-approv-
als#9-2.031. 
107 DAWSON, Michael. Popular Sovereignty, Double Jeopardy, and the Dual Sov-
ereignty Doctrine, Yale Law Journal, v. 102, n. 1, p. 293, 1992.
108 OWSLEY, David. Accepting the Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeop-
ardy: A Hard Case Study, Washington University Law Review, v. 81, n. 3, p. 
793, 2003; Woods, Christina, op. cit., note 9, p. 189. 
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the burdens associated with multiple prosecutions for substantially the 
same act; to promote efficient utilization of resources of the Department 
of Justice; and to promote coordination and cooperation between federal 
and state prosecutors.109
The Petite Policy allows the initiation or continuation of 
a federal prosecution following a prior state or federal prosecution 
based on substantially the same acts if the following three requisites 
are satisfied: first, the matter must involve a substantial federal interest; 
second, the state prosecution must have left that interest demonstrably 
unvindicated; and third, the federal prosecutor must believe that conduct 
of the defendant constitutes a federal offense, and that the admissible 
evidence probably will be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction 
by an unbiased trier of fact.110 
In addition, the federal prosecution must be approved by the 
appropriate Assistant Attorney General.111 
In determining whether a second prosecution may be authorized, 
it has been noted that the second criterion is critical.112 
Satisfaction of the previous requirements does not mean, 
however, that a proposed prosecution necessarily must be approved 
or brought. Traditional elements of federal prosecutorial discretion 
continue to apply.113
109 Justice Manual, Title 9: Criminal, Section 9-2.031 – Dual and Successive Pros-
ecution Policy (“Petite Policy”), Statement of Policy. 
110 Justice Manual, Title 9: Criminal, Section 9-2.031 – Dual and Successive Pros-
ecution Policy (“Petite Policy”), Statement of Policy. 
111 Justice Manual, Title 9: Criminal, Section 9-2.031 – Dual and Successive 
Prosecution Policy (“Petite Policy”), Statement of Policy; PODGOR, Ellen. 
Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing Discretionary Justice, Cornell 
Journal of Law and Public Policy, v. 13, n. 2, p. 178, 2004; COONEY, John. 
Multi-Jurisdictional and Successive Prosecution of Environmental Crimes: 
The Case for a Consistent Approach, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 
v. 96, n. 2, p. 448, 2006.
112 COONEY, John. Multi-Jurisdictional and Successive Prosecution of Environ-
mental Crimes: The Case for a Consistent Approach, Journal of Criminal Law 
and Criminology, v. 96, n. 2, p. 448, 2006.
113 Justice Manual, Title 9: Criminal, Section 9-2.031 – Dual and Successive Pros-
ecution Policy (“Petite Policy”), Statement of Policy.
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Notwithstanding the Federal Government has discretion to dismiss 
cases when the Petite Policy is violated,114 defendants are not afforded 
the same opportunity.115 Courts116 have found that the Petite Policy is a 
doctrine of federal prosecutorial policy, not a matter of constitutional law. 
Therefore, failing to adhere to the internal guidelines of the Department 
of Justice would not be sufficient to warrant court action.117 
Scholars have extendedly criticized the Petite Policy, characterizing 
it as an incomplete protection,118 noting that only the government can 
invoke it119 and that it is “neither clear nor fully understood by federal 
prosecutors”.120 Moreover, critics state that some standards of the policy 
are vague and that the Justice Department has not clarified them.121
5.  the dual soveReIgnty doctRIne afteR gamble v. unIted states
The current vitality of the legal basis of the dual sovereignty 
doctrine, the existence of safeguards against potential abuses and the 
114 For instance, Thompson v. United States, 444 U.S. 248 (1980); Marakar v. 
United States, 370 U. S. 723 (1962). 
115 MCANINCH, William. Unfolding the Law of Double Jeopardy, South Carolina 
Law Review, v. 44, n. 3, p. 426, 1993.
116 PODGOR, Ellen. Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing Discretionary 
Justice, Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, v. 13, n. 2, p. 180 (notes 75 
and 76), 2004.
117 PODGOR, Ellen. Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing Discretionary 
Justice, Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, v. 13, n. 2, p. 179-180, 2004; 
KING, James. The Problem of Double Jeopardy in Successive Federal-State 
Prosecutions: A Fifth Amendment Solution, Stanford Law Review, v. 31, n. 3, 
pp. 489-490, 1979; DAWSON, Michael. Popular Sovereignty, Double Jeopardy, 
and the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine, Yale Law Journal, v. 102, n. 1, p. 293, 1992.
118 DAWSON, Michael. Popular Sovereignty, Double Jeopardy, and the Dual Sov-
ereignty Doctrine, Yale Law Journal, v. 102, n. 1, p. 293, 1992.
119 DAWSON, Michael. Popular Sovereignty, Double Jeopardy, and the Dual Sov-
ereignty Doctrine, Yale Law Journal, v. 102, n. 1, p. 293, 1992.
120 KING, James. The Problem of Double Jeopardy in Successive Federal-State 
Prosecutions: A Fifth Amendment Solution, Stanford Law Review, v. 31, n. 3, 
p. 492, 1979.
121 KING, James. The Problem of Double Jeopardy in Successive Federal-State 
Prosecutions: A Fifth Amendment Solution, Stanford Law Review, v. 31, n. 3, 
p. 492, 1979.
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lack of judicial alternatives become improbable any drastic deviation 
from the status quo.122 Gamble v. United States proves it. 
How should the dual sovereignty doctrine be faced after Gamble 
v. United States? 
Adam Adler has pointed out that the problem with most of 
the criticisms against the dual sovereignty doctrine is that they focus 
too much on the double jeopardy clause, excluding other legal or 
constitutional provisions.123 For instance, to solve the problems inherent 
to the dual sovereignty doctrine James King suggests to apply a new 
Fifth Amendment standard,124 argument that has been permanently 
rejected by the Supreme Court.
Besides the “sham exception” and the Petite Policy, David 
Owsley has stated that potential abuses under the dual sovereignty 
doctrine could be correctly addressed by political accountability of 
the executive branch; state legislation; federal sentencing guidelines, 
which can prevent duplicative punishment or mitigate the unfairness 
of a successive prosecution; and continuing vigilance of state and 
national electorates, who can consent at any time through legislation, 
generally or particularly tailored, to the adjudications of other 
jurisdictions.125
Although the effectiveness of these safeguards could certainly be 
discussed, especially the political accountability of the executive branch 
and the continuing vigilance of state and national electorates, one of 
the merits of Owsley is having put the focus on constitutional and legal 
provisions different to the Fifth Amendment. 
122 OWSLEY, David. Accepting the Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeop-
ardy: A Hard Case Study, Washington University Law Review, v. 81, n. 3, p. 
800, 2003.
123 ADLER, Adam. Dual Sovereignty, Due Process, and Duplicative Punishment: 
A New Solution to an Old Problem, Yale Law Journal, v. 124, n. 2, p. 451, 2014.
124 KING, James. The Problem of Double Jeopardy in Successive Federal-State 
Prosecutions: A Fifth Amendment Solution, Stanford Law Review, v. 31, n. 3, 
p. 478, 1979.
125 OWSLEY, David. Accepting the Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeop-
ardy: A Hard Case Study, Washington University Law Review, v. 81, n. 3, pp. 
795-796, 2003.
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The same Supreme Court recognized in Hudson v. United States 
that some of the ills at which some interpretations on double jeopardy 
have been directed are addressed by other constitutional provisions.126
From my perspective, eventual excesses under the dual 
sovereignty doctrine could be prevented by the application of the cruel 
and unusual punishments clause contained in the Eighth Amendment,127 
which provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted”. The Eighth 
Amendment was adopted in 1791, directly from the English Bill of Rights 
of 1689.128 The history of the Eighth Amendment indicates that the 
framers intended the entire amendment to act as a limit on the power 
of the government to punish.129 
The Eighth Amendment incorporates three different prohibitions: 
a prohibition of excessive bail, a prohibition of cruel and unusual 
punishments, which is concerned with matters such as the duration or 
conditions of confinement, and a prohibition of excessive fines, which 
limits the power of the government to extract payments as punishment 
for some offense.130 
126 Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 102-103 (1997).
127 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U. S. 957, 996-997 (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in judgment) (1991). See also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 
277, 284 (1983); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003); HOFFMANN, 
Joseph. The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. A Limit on the Power 
to Punish or Constitutional Rhetoric? In: BODENHAMER, David and ELY, 
James (Eds.). The Bill of Rights in Modern America, Indiana University Press, 
2008, p. 185.
128 GRANUCCI, Anthony. “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:” The 
Original Meaning, California Law Review, v. 57, n. 4, p. 840, 1969.
129 REINHART, Douglas. Applying the Eighth Amendment to Civil Forfeiture 
after Austin v. United States: Excessiveness and Proportionality, William & 
Mary Law Review, v. 36, n. 1, p. 252, 1994.
130 Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 558 (1993); ALBIN, Laurel Anne. 
Notes: Constitutional Limitations of Civil in Rem Forfeiture and the Double 
Jeopardy Dilemma: Civil in Rem Forfeiture Constitutes Punishment and Is Sub-
ject to Excessive Fines Analysis. Aravanis v. Somerset County, 339 Md. 644, 664 
A.2d 888 (1995), Cert. Denied, 116 S. Ct. 916 (1996), University of Baltimore 
Law Review, v. 26, n. 1, p. 156, 1996. See also Browning-Ferris Industries v. 
Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 265 (1989); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 
609-610 (1993); United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 328 (1998).
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The Supreme Court has stated that the cruel and unusual 
punishments clause contained in the Eighth Amendment “circumscribes 
the criminal process in three ways: First, it limits the kinds of punishment 
that can be imposed on those convicted of crimes (…); second, it proscribes 
punishment grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime (…); 
and third, it imposes substantive limits on what can be made criminal 
and punished as such”.131 
Regarding the scope of the cruel and unusual punishments 
clause, today is well settled that it does not only prohibit those forms 
of punishment that are “barbaric”, but also those that are “excessive” in 
relation to the crime committed.132 The Supreme Court has underlined 
that although legislation is enacted from an experience of evils, it should 
not be necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. 
“Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. 
Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than 
the mischief which gave it birth”.133 Accordingly, the Eighth Amendment 
“must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark 
the progress of a maturing society”.134
The first time the Supreme Court declared a punishment 
cruel and unusual under the eighth amendment was in Weems v. 
United States, decided in 1910.135 In this case, the defendant had been 
convicted of falsifying a public document and sentenced to 15 years of 
“cadena temporal”, a form of imprisonment that included hard labor in 
chains and permanent civil disabilities. After endorsing the principle of 
proportionality as a constitutional standard, affirming that “it is a precept 
131 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977).
132 Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349, 373 (1910); Coker v. Georgia, 433 
U.S. 584, 592 (1977); CLAPP, Randy. Eighth Amendment Proportionality, 
American Journal of Criminal Law, v. 7, n. 2, p. 260, 1979.
133 Weems v. United States, 373.
134 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
135 CLAPP, Randy. Eighth Amendment Proportionality, American Journal of 
Criminal Law, v. 7, n. 2, p. 260, 1979; ROOKER, John. Crime and Punishment: 
The Eighth Amendment’s Proportionality Guarantee after Harmelin v. Mich-
igan, Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law, v. 7, n. 1, pp. 162-163, 
1992; GRANUCCI, Anthony. “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflict-
ed:” The Original Meaning, California Law Review, v. 57, n. 4, p. 843, 1969.
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of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned 
to offense”,136 the Supreme Court expressed its abhorrence to the cruelty 
of “cadena temporal”. The Court held that it was “cruel in its excess of 
imprisonment and that which accompanies and follows imprisonment. It 
is unusual in its character. Its punishments come under the condemnation 
of the Bill of Rights, both on account of their degree and kind”.137
The reasoning in Weems was followed in Trop v. Dulles. In this 
instance, the Supreme Court found that the sanction of denaturalization 
for the offence of wartime desertion violated the Eighth Amendment. The 
Court pointed out that even though denaturalization did involve neither 
physical mistreatment nor primitive torture, there was instead the total 
destruction of the individual’s status in organized society. The Court 
found that denaturalization was a form of punishment “more primitive 
than torture, for it destroys for the individual the political existence that 
was centuries in the development”.138
The Supreme Court subsequently applied the proportionality 
principle in Robinson v. California and Coker v. Georgia. In the first 
case, the Court ruled that a ninety-day prison sentence for the crime 
of being addicted to narcotics was contrary to the Eighth Amendment. 
Even though ninety days’ imprisonment is not clearly a sentence “cruel 
and unusual” in abstract,139 the Court found that the punishment was 
disproportionate to the crime.140 In Coker v. Georgia, the Supreme Court 
held that a sentence of death was grossly disproportionate and excessive 
for the crime of rape of an adult woman and was therefore forbidden by 
the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment.141
136 Weems v. United States, 367.
137 Weems v. United States, 377; CLAPP, Randy. Eighth Amendment Propor-
tionality, American Journal of Criminal Law, v. 7, n. 2, p. 260, 1979.
138 Trop v. Dulles, 101. 
139 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
140 Robinson v. California, 667; HOFFMANN, Joseph. The Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause. A Limit on the Power to Punish or Constitutional Rhet-
oric? In: BODENHAMER, David and ELY, James (Eds.). The Bill of Rights in 
Modern America, Indiana University Press, 2008, p. 185. 
141 Coker v. Georgia, 592. 
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In Solem v. Helm, decided in 1983, the Court ruled that a life 
sentence without possibility of parole under a recidivist statute for a 
person convicted of seven nonviolent felonies was disproportionate. 
In this case, the accused was convicted of issuing a “no account” check 
for $100. The crime was punishable with five years’ imprisonment 
but under the recidivist statute of South Dakota the accused, who had 
previously been convicted of six nonviolent felonies, was sentenced 
to imprisonment without possibility of parole.142 The Supreme 
Court rejected the argument of the government that the principle of 
proportionality did not apply to felony prison sentences,143 explaining 
that it had been already recognized that the Eighth Amendment imposes 
“parallel limitations” on bail, fines, and other punishments. Accordingly, 
as a matter of principle the Court held a straightforward idea: “a 
criminal sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which the 
defendant has been convicted”.144 
In applying the proportionality principle contained in the cruel 
and unusual punishments clause, the Supreme Court has ruled, for instance, 
that executing offenders who committed crimes while under the age of 
eighteen was unconstitutional.145 The Court has also stated that executions 
of mentally retarded criminals are “cruel and unusual punishments” 
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.146 
142 Solem v. Helm, 279-283. 
143 Solem v. Helm, 288.
144 Solem v. Helm, 290.
145 The Court firstly held, in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988), 
that executing offenders who committed crimes while under the age of six-
teen was unconstitutional. In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) the 
Court extended the prohibition to offenders who committed crimes while 
under the age of eighteen. Roper v. Simmons overruled Stanford v. Kentucky, 
492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989), a decision in which the Court concluded that the 
“Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments did not proscribe the execution of ju-
venile offenders over 15 but under 18”.
146 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). Before Atkins v. Virginia, the 
Court had ruled that the Eighth Amendment did not mandate a categorical 
exemption from the death penalty for the mentally retarded defendants. See 
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989).
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Eight years after Solem, however, the Supreme Court weakened 
the proportionality principle in Harmelin v. Michigan.147 In this case, the 
defendant had been convicted of possessing 672 grams of cocaine and 
sentenced under Michigan state law to a mandatory life term without 
the possibility of parole.148 The majority of the Court rejected the claim 
of the defendant that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment, but 
the Court could not agree on why the proportionality argument of the 
defendant failed. 
On the one hand, Justice Scalia, joined by the Chief Justice, 
wrote that the proportionality principle was “an aspect of our death 
penalty jurisprudence, rather than a generalizable aspect of Eighth 
Amendment law”.149 Therefore, outside the capital context the “Eighth 
Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee”.150 On the other hand, 
Justice Kennedy, joined by two other Members of the Court, expressly 
recognized that “the Eighth Amendment proportionality principle also 
applies to noncapital sentences”. Kennedy identified four principles of 
proportionality review: “the primacy of the legislature, the variety of 
legitimate penological schemes, the nature of our federal system, and 
the requirement that proportionality review be guided by objective 
factors”. Subsequently, he concluded that the Eighth Amendment does 
not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, 
it forbids only extreme sentences that are “grossly disproportionate” to 
the crime,151 which was not the case of Harmelin.152 
147 BAKER, Roozbeh, Proportionality in the Criminal Law: The Differing Amer-
ican versus Canadian Approaches to Punishment, University of Miami In-
ter-American Law Review, v. 39, n. 3, p. 488, 2008.
148 Harmelin v. Michigan, 961.
149 Harmelin v. Michigan, 994.
150 Harmelin v. Michigan, 957. See also Rummel v. Estelle, 272; Hutto v. Da-
vis, 454 U.S. 370, 374 (1982); ROOKER, John. Crime and Punishment: The 
Eighth Amendment’s Proportionality Guarantee after Harmelin v. Michigan, 
Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law, v. 7, n. 1, p. 166, 1992.
151 Harmelin v. Michigan, 1004-1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in judgment). 
152 Harmelin v. Michigan, 1009 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in judgment). 
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In Ewing v. California, decided in 2003, the Supreme Court finally 
adopted the guide suggested by Justice Kennedy. In this case, the defendant, 
while on parole, was convicted of felony grand theft for stealing three 
golf clubs, worth $399 apiece. Because the defendant had been previously 
convicted of four serious or violent felonies, the prosecutor alleged and 
the trial court applied the California’s three strikes law, sentencing him 
to 25 years to life. The Supreme Court stated that the Eighth Amendment 
contains a “narrow proportionality principle”, which only forbids extreme 
sentences that are “grossly disproportionate”’ to the crime.153 Regarding 
the case in question, the Court concluded that the sentence of 25 years 
to life in prison, imposed on the defendant for the offense of felony 
grand theft under the three strikes law was not grossly disproportionate, 
therefore there was no violation of the Eighth Amendment.154 
How should the Eighth Amendment apply in cases of multi 
sovereignties prosecutions? 
If the Eighth Amendment is to serve as a “backup” for cumulative 
punishments imposed in multi sovereignties prosecutions, then the 
analysis of proportionality should consider all the penalties together 
and not one at a time.155 Therefore, in order to determine whether a 
disproportionate sanction has been imposed on the defendant every court 
that sanctions the defendant will have to consider all the penalties that 
have been previously imposed on the defendant for the same conduct, 
including those ordered by different courts.156 
For instance, if a defendant is convicted in a state prosecution 
for theft to ten years’ imprisonment, and later is convicted in a federal 
prosecution for the same conduct to fifteen’ years imprisonment, the 
question to resolve will not be whether a penalty of ten or fifteen years’ 
153 Ewing v. California, 20. See also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003).
154 Ewing v. California, 30; LEE, Youngjae. The Constitutional Right against Ex-
cessive Punishment, Virginia Law Review, v. 91, n. 3, pp. 694-695, 2005.
155 KING, Nancy. Portioning Punishment: Constitutional Limits on Successive 
and Excessive Penalties, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, v. 144, n. 1, p. 
150, 1995.
156 KING, Nancy. Portioning Punishment: Constitutional Limits on Successive 
and Excessive Penalties, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, v. 144, n. 1, p. 
152, 1995.
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imprisonment is disproportionate for a theft, but rather whether a sanction 
of twenty-five years’ imprisonment for a theft respects the principle of 
proportionality under the Eighth Amendment. 
A dual sovereignty exception to the Eighth Amendment would 
be clearly a mistake.157
conclusIons
Under the dual sovereignty doctrine of the Supreme Court of 
the United States, successive criminal prosecutions against the same 
defendant for the same conduct do not violate the double jeopardy clause 
in three cases: (1) successive prosecutions by multiple state governments; 
(2) successive prosecutions by a state and the federal government; and 
(3) successive prosecutions by a state or the Federal Government and a 
foreign government. 
Notwithstanding the dual sovereignty doctrine has been strongly 
criticized by scholars, the Supreme Court has persistently upheld it. Indeed, 
in Gamble v. United States, decided in 2019, the Supreme Court once again 
upheld its long-standing dual sovereignty doctrine. The current vitality 
of the dual sovereignty doctrine, therefore, could hardly be challenged. 
Taking into account the above, the discussion should focus on the 
safeguards against eventual abuses committed under the dual sovereignty 
doctrine. 
Regarding the existing safeguards, they are two: the “sham 
exception” and the “Petite Policy”. Both have proved, however, to be 
insufficient. Concerning the sham exception, even though many courts 
have accepted it, they have not applied it, setting an insuperable burden 
for defendants to overcome. With regard to the Petite Policy, it has 
shown the problems with self-regulation in the context of criminal 
justice. Although the Department of Justice has tried to conform its 
practices to the “sham exception”, the Petite Policy has been deemed 
unenforceable: courts have ruled that the Petite Policy is not a matter of 
constitutional law, therefore failing to adhere to the internal guidelines 
157 KING, Nancy. Portioning Punishment: Constitutional Limits on Successive 
and Excessive Penalties, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, v. 144, n. 1, p. 
155, 1995.
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of the Department of Justice is not sufficient to warrant court action. 
Considering the ineffectiveness of the existing safeguards, it would seem 
necessary to develop other safeguards against eventual abuses committed 
under the dual sovereignty doctrine. From my perspective, eventual 
excesses under the dual sovereignty doctrine could be prevented by the 
application of the cruel and unusual punishments clause contained in the 
Eighth Amendment, which forbids extreme sentences that are “grossly 
disproportionate”’ to the crime. 
The Eighth Amendment would serve as a “backup” for cumulative 
punishments imposed in multi sovereignties prosecutions allowed by 
the double jeopardy clause. For purposes of determining whether a 
disproportionate sanction has been imposed on the defendant in multi 
sovereignties prosecutions, the analysis of proportionality should consider 
all the penalties together and not one at a time. Therefore, every court 
that sanctions the defendant will have to consider all the penalties that 
have been previously imposed on the defendant for the same conduct, 
including those ordered by different courts.
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